

~~SECRET - EYES ONLY~~

INSPECTOR GENERAL
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75-3712

02C 75-2643

JHC

17 October 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Contact with SSC Staff - 16 October 1975

1. Fritz Schwarz at the beginning of the day and at lunch time, and Bill Miller late in the day, took the opportunity of the review of the assassination draft to discuss general problems. I presumed to make a few points on my understanding of the issues, which this memorandum reports.

2. Both Schwarz and Miller indicated that too much time had been spent on the subject of assassination. I expressed the opinion that having dwelt on a dramatic activity that is atypical, the result must have some distortion in the view of how the Agency really operates. I expressed the opinion that it was in certain kinds of highly sensitive activities, compartmented because of their operational and/or political sensitivity, that there will be the most difficulty in documenting because of bureaucratic approvals, etc. I stated that the Agency had been created out of the whole cloth in dramatic times when it was supposed to perform rather than organize. The incremental record of regularization of affairs over the years is quite familiar to those who have followed the way things have developed. I expressed the opinion that the Senate could hardly address the command-and-control problem until it understands how the Agency, as a whole, is run, and what its track record is in getting in charge of its own affairs.

3. When Miller came in towards the end of the day I told him that much of the draft that I had read posed some major problems. There is extensive mentioning of the true names of CIA employees involved in activities related to assassination. Some of them are now dead and do not require personal protection, but I was not sure what purpose was served in using their names. In fact, use of their names would stand out in contrast to the names of those directly involved which are suppressed or cancelled as they should be. I noted that the detailed treatment for which the draft had opted had so involved the use of these names that it was almost impossible to

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sanitize the report without destroying the sense of the most effective sections.

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The use of this technique I thought should not be publicized. Miller viewed my reservations as generally manageable, not sensing the extent to which some of the portions I had read would have to be modified. I told him that Schwarz had said that the Senate was scheduled to act on the report next week and I felt it was impossible to get the job done in that time.

4. Miller was interested in the general reaction to what I had read today. He had asked Bill Hyland, whose requirements permitted him to move more rapidly than we could, considering our problems. Hyland simply said flatly that it should not be published. Miller pressed me on this point. I advanced the reasoning, for which he obviously was prepared, that publication of this would be injurious to the national interest. He countered by saying that the Committee felt that all the facts as its members knew them should be published to speak for themselves. I expressed the opinion that this reflected a basic posture that was contrary to the view that I held. I felt that in a remarkable and unprecedented period in history our country had found itself caught up in a myraid of challenges, real and imaginary, to which it had responded, with full executive and legislative support. If the belief is that secrecy is wrong then it had better be faced at the beginning, rather than later in the infinitely detailed on-the-one hand-and-on-the-other-hand treatment such as given in the report. When he mentioned plausible deniability, I replied that a lot had been hidden under that rubric but that there was a fact of life that had preceded that by many years and would continue into the future. This is a question of "face." I told him that when Gary Powers was shot down Khrushchev knew that we had sent him and Khrushchev knew that we knew that he knew. There would have been a summit meeting if Eisenhower hadn't acknowledged the whole thing. I observed that the Senate Committee in its fullest sense of responsibility should consider the implications of this factor, and how it will impact on

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foreign relations of the United States. As he pressed me I finally said that while I did not want to be rude I should ask him a question that will occur to others. I asked him if it was possible that the report had been written this way so that it would be so unacceptable to the Administration that the Executive would have to accept the blame for not publishing it. He said such was not the case.



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Deputy Inspector General

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